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§5.31

Spousal Testimonial Privilege

There are two commonly recognized marital privileges. One is the spousal testimonial privilege,
and the other is the marital confidences privilege. 1 The testimonial privilege gives witnesses the
right to refuse to testify against their spouse in criminal proceedings, and, in some state
jurisdictions, gives criminal defendants the power to prevent their spouses from testifying against
them. The confidences privilege allows witnesses to refuse to reveal their own confidential marital
communications and to prevent their spouse from doing so.
The testimonial privilege is the broader of the two in that it precludes all adverse testimony by
the spouse, not merely disclosure of confidential communications. The testimonial privilege
normally extends even to matters occurring prior to the marriage, 2 while the communications
privilege covers only those confidential communications made during the course of the marriage.
The testimonial privilege is the narrower of the two, in that it applies only in criminal
prosecutions where one spouse is a defendant. 3 In contrast, the communications privilege applies
in both criminal and civil cases and does not require either spouse to be a party. Also the
testimonial privilege lasts only as long as the marriage relationship, while the communications
privilege provides ongoing protection for confidential communications uttered during the
marriage. Thus former spouses may not assert a privilege to refuse to testify against one another,
but they cannot testify to matters covered by the marital communications privilege.
Doctrine of spousal incompetency
The testimonial privilege evolved from the common law doctrine rendering a spouse
incompetent to testify for or against the other. This incompetency resulted from the rule that a
party was ineligible to testify on his own behalf, combined with the legal fiction that husband and
wife were but one person. 4
In the 1933 decision of Funk v. United States, 5 the Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of
spousal incompetency so as to permit a defendant’s spouse to testify in the defendant’s behalf.
However, Funk left unaltered the rule that either spouse could prevent the other from presenting
adverse testimony. The rule thus evolved from a ground of incompetency to a spousal privilege.
§5.31 1. The marital confidences privilege is discussed in §5.32, infra.
2. See URE 504(b) (1999). But see proposed-but-rejected FRE 505(c)(2) (containing an exception for “matters
occurring prior to the marriage”).
3. See United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2013) (spousal testimonial privilege is “both broader and
narrower” than marital communications privilege); United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 435-436 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(wife had no privilege to refuse to testify about husband’s violent character where husband was murder victim rather
than defendant).
4. See Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, Bk. 1 at 441 (1768) (“By marriage, the husband and wife
are one person in law.”).
5. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).

Rationale for privilege
The rationale for the testimonial privilege is to protect the harmony and sanctity of the marital
relationship. 6 Testimony by one spouse against the other in a criminal prosecution would likely be
an “unforgivable act” sealing the fate of any marriage. 7 Also, letting the state pit spouse against
spouse without the consent of either would offend fundamental societal values. It is repellant to
force husband or wife to breach the trust of marriage by becoming the instrument of the other’s
criminal conviction. 8
Who holds privilege
In Hawkins v. United States, 9 the Court held that both spouses were holders of the privilege,
and that each could prevent adverse testimony by the other. Most often a defendant in a criminal
case claimed the privilege to keep the prosecutor from calling defendant’s spouse as a witness.10
Twenty-two years after Hawkins, however, the Court in Trammel v. United States 11 reconsidered
the issue, and decided that only the witness spouse holds the privilege. Under Trammel, the witness
spouse may testify against the defendant spouse voluntarily, regardless of the wishes of the
defendant, but cannot be compelled to do so against her own wishes. 12.
The Trammel Court noted the trend in state statutes away from vesting the privilege in the
6. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) (basic reason for refusing “to pit wife against husband or
husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster
family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as well”).
7. Id. at 78-79 (law should not “force or encourage testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or further
inflame existing domestic differences”).
8. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2228 at 217 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But see 5 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial
Evidence 340 (1827) (spousal testimonial privilege goes far beyond making “every man’s house his castle” and
permits a person to convert his house into “a den of thieves”; it “secures, to every man, one safe and unquestionable
and ever ready accomplice for every imagineable crime”); Medine, The Adverse Testimony Privilege: Time to
Dispose of a “Sentimental Relic,” 67 Or. L. Rev. 519 (1988). Both the Model Code of Evidence Rule 215 (1942)
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence Rule 28 (1953) omitted the spousal testimonial privilege but included a spousal
confidences privilege.
9. 358 U.S. 74, 77-79 (1958).
10. See proposed-but-rejected FRE 505(a) (making defendant spouse the sole holder of privilege).
11. 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
12. United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (defendant lacks standing to appeal trial court’s
finding that spousal testimonial privilege was waived; privilege belongs to testifying spouse only).

defendant spouse and concluded that modification of the federal rule was appropriate because
“[w]hen one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding—whatever the
motivation—their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of
marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.” 13 When both spouses are potentially subject to
prosecution, however, Trammel makes it more likely that they will be pitted against each other in
negotiating with the prosecutor for favorable individual treatment. It is at least doubtful that
testimony given by a spouse in exchange for leniency is voluntary in any realistic sense of that
term, or that caving in to pressure from the prosecutor indicates a breakdown of the marriage, 14
and Trammel’s views on this subject seem shortsighted. 15
The Trammel holding is binding only on federal courts, although URE 504 was amended in
1986 to conform with the holding. 16 Since Trammel, some states have amended their testimonial
privilege statutes to make the witness spouse the sole holder of the privilege. 17
The testimonial privilege only allows the witness spouse to refuse to give adverse testimony,
and does not entitle the witness spouse to refuse to give testimony that would be helpful to the
defendant spouse. 18 According to the clear weight of authority, the spousal testimonial privilege
applies only in criminal cases, 19 including grand jury proceedings and criminal forfeiture
proceedings. 20
13. Id. at 52. Compare Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) (“[N]ot all marital flare-ups in which one
spouse wants to hurt the other are permanent.”).
14. See Lempert, A Right to Every Woman’s Evidence, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 725, 733-737 (1981).
15. Cf. United States v. Bad Wound, 203 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000) (spouse’s plea agreement promise to
provide “complete and truthful testimony before grand juries, at trial, and at other proceedings as required” was
sufficient to waive spousal testimonial privilege).
16. See URE 504(b) (1999) (spouse of an accused “has a privilege to refuse to testify against the accused spouse”).
17. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. §40.255.
18. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (privilege applies only to “adverse spousal testimony”). See
also United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 2013) (providing helpful testimony to the defendant spouse
may result in waiver of the privilege, making it “especially important for defense counsel to stay alert”).
19. See proposed-but-rejected FRE 505(a); URE 504(c) (1999). Cf. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir.
1977) (leaving open question whether spousal testimonial privilege can ever apply in civil cases), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 820.
20. See United States v. Yerardi, 192 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (adverse spousal testimony privilege applicable in
criminal forfeiture proceeding); In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 692-694 (3d Cir. 1982) (if integrity of
privilege is to be maintained, “a wife who asserts the privilege should not be compelled to testify before a grand jury
when her spouse is a target of the same underlying investigation as the party against whom she is called to testify
and her testimony is sought with the expectation that it may lead to his indictment by a subsequent grand jury”),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015.

Lawful marriage
The privilege generally applies only to couples who are lawfully married (and not to persons
who simply live together), 21 and lawful marriages include same-sex marriages. 22 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Obergefell affords same-sex couples the right to marry in all 50 states, and
this decision certainly supports (and may even require) extending the marital confidences
privilege to same-sex marriages. Indeed, it may well be that persons in same-sex marriages under
Obergefell can claim the protection of the confidences privilege for communications made while
they were living in their committed domestic arrangements before Obergefell recognized these as
constitutionally protected. 23 Prior to Obergefell, some states extended the privilege to persons in
civil unions or domestic partnerships, that were sometimes created as a measure to add status and
security to same-sex couples while not calling the relationship “marriage” and not extending to
such relationships the full panoply of rights and legal understandings that traditionally apply to
marriages. 24 What the future may hold for civil unions and domestic partnerships after Obergefell,
to the extent that they continue to define or recognize relationships that differ in some significant
way from marriages, is less certain, and it is hard to predict how privilege issues in such
relationships might be resolved. 25. Common law marriages are covered too, but only if they are
recognized as valid by the jurisdiction where the couple resides. 26 Courts have not extended the
privilege to other intimate relationships, 27 even where the parties are living together and are “for

21. United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir. 1983) (privilege requires “a valid marital relationship”).
22. See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §1204(e)(15) (2008); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §457-A:6 (2008). In 2015, the
Supreme Court extended the right to marry to same-sex couples in all 50 states. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015).
23. See Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 Cal. L. Rev. 105 (2017); Steven A. Young, Retroactive
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage for the Purposes of the Confidential Marital Communications Privilege, 58 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 319 (2016).
24. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §37:1-32(o) (2008) (civil union); Or. Rev. Stat. §106.340(1) (2007) (domestic
partnership).
25. .See David Pimentel, The Impact of Obergefell: Traditional Marriage’s New Lease on Life?, 30 BYU J. Pub. L.
251, 269 (2016) (noting that some states have abolished civil unions upon legalizing marriage for all; now that
“marriage is available to everyone, there may be little continuing reason to recognize domestic partnerships, or
other, lesser alternatives to the marriage contract”).
26. See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747-748 (9th Cir. 1977) (privilege depends upon “existence of a valid
marriage, as determined by state law”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926.
27. See United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514 (4th Cir. 1995) (court refuses to recognize marital communications
privilege or spousal testimonial privilege for couple who had lived together for 25 years but had not gotten married

all practical purposes husband and wife.” 28
Sham marriages
The privilege does not apply to “sham” marriages, where the parties do not intend to live or
remain as husband and wife but are using their temporary marital status for a fraudulent purpose
such as to violate immigration laws. 29 The fact that the parties married shortly before trial of one
spouse on criminal charges, thereby preventing the other spouse from being a witness, does not
necessarily prove that the marriage is a sham. 30 Proposed-but-rejected Rule 505(c)(2) would have
created an exception for “matters occurring prior to the marriage,” thereby preventing a defendant
from “suppressing testimony by marrying the witness.” 31 This provision was not enacted, and the
privilege applies not only to testimony on acts, events, or conditions occurring during marriage,
but to acts, events, or conditions occurring prior to the marriage.
Moribund marriages
Some courts have held that the privilege is inapplicable to marriages that are moribund, 32
although most courts are justifiably reluctant to undertake a detailed inquiry into the health of a
marriage. 33 The privilege has also been held inapplicable where the government grants immunity
and states in which they had lived did not recognize common law marriage; court rejects Equal Protection challenge
to rule limiting privilege to married couples).
28. United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir. 1983).
29. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 614-615 (1953) (war brides case where defendants and aliens had
apparently married abroad without intending to live together as spouses; such “sham, phony, empty ceremony”
rendered testimonial privilege unavailable).
30. In re Grand Jury Proceedings No. 84-5, 777 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1985) (privilege upheld where parties lived
together two years and got married after partner was served with subpoena); United States v. Davis, 237 F. Supp. 3d
1361, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (marriage was not a sham despite the fact that defendant married wife shortly after her
statement to the FBI and his indictment; evidence showed committed long-term relationship).
31. ACN, proposed-but-rejected FRE 505. Such an exception seems overly broad, because it allows compulsion of
one spouse to incriminate the other on premarital matters even where the privilege was not a motive for the
marriage.
32. In re Witness Before the Grand Jury (Carter), 791 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1986) (witness spouse and defendant had
been married 23 years but had lived apart for last 11 years; court held they “did not have the kind of vital marriage
for which the privilege was created”).
33. Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980) (doubting that courts “can assess the social worthiness of
particular marriages” or their need for protection of privilege); United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.
1978) (refusing to condition privilege “on a judicial determination that the marriage is a happy or successful one”).

against use of a spouse’s testimony or any fruits thereof against the other spouse. 34
Extrajudicial statements
Most courts hold that the privilege applies only to testimony by the spouse and does not block
admission of extrajudicial statements of one spouse offered against the other, where such
statements are admissible under the hearsay doctrine. 35 However, some authorities view the
privilege as barring introduction of extrajudicial disclosures of a spouse, 36 and such extrajudicial
statements are of course often excludable on hearsay grounds. 37
Exceptions
There are several generally recognized exceptions to the privilege. The privilege is inapplicable
in proceedings where one spouse is charged with a crime or tort against the person or property of
the other or a minor child of either. 38 URE 504 recognizes an exception where a spouse is charged
with a crime or tort against the person or property of “an individual residing in the household of
either” and also where the victim is a third person “if the crime or tort is committed in the course
of committing a crime or tort” against the spouse, a minor child of either, or an individual residing

See generally Note, “Honey, the Judge Says We’re History”: Abrogating the Marital Privileges via Modern
Doctrines of Marital Worthiness, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 843 (1992).
34. In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1083 (3d Cir. 1997) (privilege against being compelled to testify against spouse
defeated where government grants use and derivative use immunity thereby promising wife that neither her
testimony or any fruits thereof will be used against her husband).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 1989) (extrajudicial statements “are not
excludable on the basis of the spousal privilege”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932; United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d
1035, 1037-1039 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (marital privilege “should not be extended to bar a
witness from relating an excited utterance by a spouse”).
36. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence 225-226 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (it can be argued that privilege extends to
“testimonial utterance in any form” and therefore hearsay statements “are equally privileged with testimony on the
stand”).
37. United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 715 (4th Cir. 1993) (where wife asserted privilege to refuse to testify against
defendant, error for prosecutor to cross-examine defendant about “statement” wife allegedly gave to prosecutor
because such statement was inadmissible hearsay).
38. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46 n.7 (1980) (recognizing exceptions to testimonial privilege where
“one spouse commits a crime against the other” or “crimes against the spouse’s property” or “crimes against
children of either spouse”). But see United States v. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 2005) (declining to
recognize exception allowing court to compel adverse spousal testimony relating to child abuse within household).

in the household of either. 39
Joint participants
Some courts recognize an exception for situations in which spouses were joint participants in
the crime about which testimony is sought, 40 but most hold that the privilege continues even if
both spouses were involved in criminal activity. 41 In any case, recognition of a joint participants’
exception to the testimonial privilege would not necessarily make a spouse’s testimony available,
because the spouse could assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to block inquiries that would be
personally incriminating.

39. URE 504(d)(3) (1999). See also proposed-but-rejected FRE 505(c)(1).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 300-301 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing joint participant exception;
“rehabilitative effect of a marriage, which in part justifies the privilege, is diminished when both spouses are
participants in the crime”).
41. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Koecher), 755 F.2d 1022, 1026-1027 (2d Cir. 1985) (court “unable to accept the
proposition that a marriage cannot be a devoted one simply because at some time the partners have decided to
engage in a criminal activity”), vacated as moot, 475 U.S. 133; United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d 1028,
1041 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting exception); United States v. Davis, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1361, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2017)
(same). See generally Note, Partners in Crime: The Joint Participants Exception to the Privilege Against Adverse
Spousal Testimony, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1019 (1985).

